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gantt & williams

Explaining Religion to Death:
Reductionism, Evolution, and the
Psychology of Religion
Edwin E. Gantt and Richard N. Williams
Recent thinking suggests that the time is right for a reconsideration of the interface between psychology and religion.
We argue that most accounts of religion in contemporary psychology (especially as typified by evolutionary theory)
have been toxic to the phenomena of religious experience. This toxicity results from the adoption of a naturalistic
explanatory framework that renders religious phenomena as merely results of mechanical forces and material
conditions. This approach fails to take religious phenomena seriously and, thereby, dismisses their meaningfulness
before any serious investigation has begun. We argue that only by taking religious experience seriously--that is by
treating religious phenomena on their own terms as fundamentally meaningful expressions of human experience-can a fruitful scientific psychology of religion be possible. We propose the phenomenology of Emmanuel Levinas as
a viable perspective from within which to develop such a psychology of religion.

E

ven the most cursory review of the history of the
psychology of religion reveals that there has never
been a shortage of perspectives in psychology from
which to render an account of religious phenomena and
of religion itself (see, e.g., Forsyth, 2003). However, the
great majority of such accounts–for example, accounts
found in psychoanalysis, behaviorism, neuroscience,
and evolutionary psychology–have been fundamentally
toxic to religion itself. This toxicity is, we believe, the
inescapable result of various theories and methods of
psychology that are grounded firmly in a philosophy of
naturalism, a philosophy that is incapable of allowing
any phenomenon (religious or otherwise) to be other
than the merely natural outcome of non-agentic forces
and material conditions (Slife & Whoolery, 2006). We
say this not from the perspective of religious persons
who want to defend religion qua religion (although we

freely admit that we are such persons and that we do
want to defend it), but rather as psychological scientists.
As such, it is our firm belief that any science, although
its essential business is critical analysis, should not
announce the “nonexistence” of its subject matter until
after careful analysis and experimentation have shown,
to the satisfaction of sophisticated and open-minded
scholars, that there really is nothing to the phenomena
being studied.
In the field of psychology of religion,however, we
fear that far too many scholars have simply begun
their investigations of religious experience and behavior
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with an unexamined intellectual commitment to a
philosophy of naturalism that is incompatible with, and
too conceptually narrow to afford an understanding of
religion, and have then explained religion, literally, to
death. This, of course, is not a problem unique to the
psychology of religion, reflecting as it does the more
general reductive strategy that has characterized the
discipline of psychology since its inception (see Slife
& Williams, 1995). Given this general commitment to
reductionism, it comes as no surprise that behaviorists
have sought to explain religion as reinforcement history
gone wrong, psychoanalysis as a superego on guard,
neuroscience as the result of brain activity, humanism
as a means of satisfying personal needs, cognitivism as
primal thinking in the face of anxiety, and evolutionary
psychology as a strange sort of counterintuitive survival
tactic (for a more detailed treatment, see Browning &
Cooper, 2004; Forsyth, 2003; Wulff, 1997). Despite
their theoretical and practical differences, all of these
approaches nonetheless share a common commitment
to explaining religion and religious phenomena as
experienced out of existence.
Psychology’s explanatory tactic of reducing religious
phenomena to categories of nonreligious phenomena
has two origins. The first is a general disciplinary
failure to carefully explore in self-critical ways the
presumptive philosophical grounds of the psychological
theories typically deployed to explain religion. The
second is the related failure to intellectually tackle
religious phenomena from a conceptual grounding that
is both fundamental enough and rich enough to offer
an adequate or “thick” account of religious phenomena
in the first place (Geertz, 2000) . Thus reductions
of religious phenomena, by means of which such
phenomena are dismissed as epiphenomenal if not
illusory, are, in the final analysis, questions begging:
that is to say, religious phenomena are judged by the
dominant theories to be unreal primarily because they
do not fit the metaphysical categories native to the
theories themselves. We believe as a discipline that
aspires to scientific status, psychology can and must
do better than this. For, as Rolston (1999) reminds us
about the nature and aims of scientific inquiry generally,
“We often forget how everyday experience can demand
certain things of the sciences. Science must save the
phenomena . . . [and if a scientific theory cannot] . . . so
much the worse for that theory” (p. xv).

Similarly, as sociologist of religion Douglas Porpora
(2006) has recently pointed out:
In any proper experience, the object of experience
contributes something to the content of experience.
The object, in other words, is part of what explains
the content. Yet if objects of experience–whether in
religion or science–are methodologically bracketed out
of consideration, they are disallowed a priori from doing
any explanatory work. The unavoidable implication is
that there are no genuine experiences of anything so that
the very category of experience dissolves. (pp. 58-59)

In agreement, we would argue that only by taking
religion and religious experience seriously—that is,
by treating the phenomena of religious life on their
own terms as fundamentally meaningful expressions
of human social and moral experience—will a fruitful
scientific psychology of religion emerge. To adequately
understand the behavior of people, in this case religious
behavior, we believe that psychologists must understand
their experiences. “Minimally,” as Porpora (2006) notes,
“that means not to rule out tout court what people say
they are experiencing” (p.59). Thus we propose here
that the field needs to find a metaphysical ground
upon which both psychology and religion can be taken
seriously and investigated without dismissive reductions
when the categories do not fit well. We propose that the
phenomenological work of Emmanuel Levinas provides
just such a metaphysical grounding and thereby offers
the real possibility–one that will need to be thoughtfully
investigated–of a real psychology of religion.
THE INTERFACE OF PSYCHOLOGY
AND RELIGION

In examining the question of how and where
psychology and religion meet, Parsons and Jonte-Pace
(2001, p.1) refer to the and/or debate as one of the
defining features of the field of psychology of religion
from its earliest years. The term aptly reflects the
central question of whether the two disciplines can ever
be integrated in such a way that the psychological does
not simply replace the religious, or whether the two
fields (at best) just come together briefly in the context
of pursuing answers to more particular and limited
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questions. These same authors (Parsons & Jonte-Pace,
2001, p. 2) ultimately adopt the term “religion and
psychological studies” to characterize the field in its
current form with its current modus operandi. They
also observe that in the early stages of the psychology
of religion religion was regarded principally in terms
of “a series of cultural phenomena” so that the field was
focused on the “analysis of the psychological meanings,
origins, and patterns in religious ideation and practice”
(Parsons & Jonte-Pace, 2001, p. 2). Thus religious
behavior became the subject of study and psychology
became the method.
In a very significant article in American Psychologist,
Stanton L. Jones (1994) argues that the dialogue between
psychology and religion has in fact been a monologue
conducted in “one of three classic modalities,” each of
which is unidirectional and leaves “psychology being
unaffected in any substantive way by the interaction” (p.
184). Thus whether establishing a psychology of religion
to study religious experience scientifically, co-opting
psychological concepts and mental health resources for
pastoral counseling or religious education, or employing
the findings of psychological research to critique or
modify religious concepts and practices, “religion is
treated as an object, either of study, for education and
provision of services, or for reform” ( Jones, 1994, p. 185).
In none of these forms of interaction, however, is religion
considered to be a peer discipline or an equitable partner
with psychology. Clearly, as Browning and Cooper
(2004) point out, the underlying assumption is “that
while religion has very little to offer psychology, religion
can serve as an interesting object of psychological study”
(p. 246).
Shedding some historical light on this state of affairs,
Wulff (2001) has shown that the psychology of religion
emerged during a period marked by the secularization of
religion and by the application of psychological methods
to the understanding of many human phenomena
not previously studied or explained in scientific (i.e.,
naturalistic) terms. Wulff (1997) also makes it clear
that “the psychological science that evolved in twentiethcentury America was strongly influenced by positivistic
philosophy, according to which most if not all religious
statements are philosophically meaningless,” and thus
it is “comprehensible why many students, teachers, and
practitioners of psychology view religious faith as an
outdated and perhaps regrettable phenomenon” (p. 17).

EVOLUTIONARY THEORY AND THE
CONTEMPORARY INTERFACE OF
PSYCHOLOGY AND RELIGION

Perhaps nowhere do we see more clearly the dismissal
of the lived reality of the religious in the context of an
apparent conflict between experiential and explanatory
categories than in the emerging field of evolutionary
psychology. This theoretical approach has become so
popular that we will here devote substantial attention
to current evolutionary explanations of religion and
religious behavior. This treatment will illustrate
the long-standing tension between psychology and
religion and put in bold relief the contrast between
contemporary naturalistic, reductionistic approaches to
the psychology of religion and an approach we find much
more promising–one informed by the phenomenology
of Emmanuel Levinas.
The past two decades have witnessed an explosion of
scholarly interest in and publications about evolutionary
psychology (see, e.g., Buss, 1999; Cartwright, 2000;
Palmer & Palmer, 2001; Pinker, 2002; Stanovich, 2005).
Chapters on evolutionary psychological theory have
become a prominent feature of many recent texts (see,
e.g., Gaulin & McBurney, 2001; Westin, 2002). Many of
its advocates have argued that evolutionary theory is not
just a model for explaining certain specific features of
human behavior, but rather represents “a new paradigm
for psychological science” (Buss, 1995, p. 1)–one that
“provides the conceptual tools for emerging from the
fragmented state of current psychological science and
linking psychology with the rest of the life sciences in a
move toward larger scientific integration” (Buss, 1999, p.
411). Such claims have led some critics to suggest that
evolutionary theory is, in essence, a “theory of everything”
and that “sociobiology and evolutionary psychology are
but the latest efforts to develop a unifying theory that
will explain the meaning of ‘life itself ’” (Nelkin, 2000, p.
19).
Given such lofty aspirations, it is not surprising that
among the areas of human experience that evolutionary
psychologists have been most interested in exploring
are religion and religious experience, especially in terms
of their origins (see, e.g., Atran, 2002; Boyer, 2001;
Dennett, 2006; Wilson, 2002). Religious experience
and expression are, for the evolutionary psychologist,
not fundamentally unlike any other chance adaptive
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behavior in which human beings might engage for
purposes of survival and reproductive opportunity.
Indeed, as reflected in the title of his most recent book,
Rue (2005) argues that Religion Is Not About God, but
rather “is about manipulating our brains so that we
might think, feel, and act in ways that are good for us,
both individually and collectively” (p. 1). The basic
assumption behind such theorizing, noted by Pearcey
(2004) is:

Religion, then, is the result of not abandoning our
“misguided intuitions quickly,” but rather allowing them
to fester into full-grown superstitions and irrational
ritual practices, whereby we attribute supernatural
origins or theological meaning to what are in reality
merely happenstance occurrences in the natural world.
In short, according to such an evolutionary psychological
perspective, religion is by its very nature an irrational
obsession with false positives.
In this vein, Boyer (2001) argues that the light
of evolutionary theory has now shown us “how the
intractable mystery that was religion is now just another
set of difficult but manageable problems” (p. 2). The
manageable problems to which Boyer refers are the
problems of how something that seems fundamentally
irrational and counter-productive (i.e., religion) could,
despite considerable evolutionary costs, not only survive
through the centuries but even flourish. Given the
“substantial costs of religion’s material, emotional,
and cognitive commitments to factually impossible,
counterintuitive worlds,” explaining religion is a “serious
problem for any evolutionary account of human thought
and society” (Atran, 2006, pp. 302-303).
Despite its ultimate origins in biological necessity
and evolutionary happenstance, and despite various
claims regarding the possible existence of a “God gene”
or a neurological basis for religious belief (see, e.g.,
Hamer, 2004), evolutionary psychologists are quick to
point out that now “religions are transmitted culturally,
through language and symbolism, not through genes”
(Dennett, 2006, p. 24). What matters to the evolutionary
psychologist of religion, therefore, is not so much
knowing whether there might be a “‘god center’ in the
brain,” but rather “Why did those of our ancestors who
had a genetic tendency to grow a god center survive
better than rivals who did not?” (Dawkins, 2004, p. 14).

Religion is merely an idea that appears in the human mind
when the nervous system has evolved to a certain level of
complexity. That is, a brain complex enough to imagine
hidden predators, like saber-toothed tigers hiding in the
bushes, may also malfunction by imagining unseen agents
that are not real, like gods and spirits. (p. 55)

For example, according to some evolutionary
psychologists, religious belief in supernatural agents
(i.e., gods, angels, spirits, etc.) initially arose because
“some inference systems in the mind are specialized in
the detection of apparent animacy and agency in objects
around us” (Boyer, 2001, p. 144). Barrett (2000), for
example, has argued that the human mind has been
programmed by natural selection to infer the presence
of intentional agents from among the events of the
surrounding environment. Presumably, in our early
evolutionary history it was vitally important for the
day-to-day survival of our ancestors that they be able to
quickly detect both danger and promise in the sounds
and movements of the objects around them because
such sounds and movements might well signal the
presence of either predator or prey. However, according
to Boyer (2001), this innate “agency detection system” is
naturally “biased toward overdetection” and thus tends
to “jump to conclusions” (p. 145), causing us to infer
the presence of intentional agents in certain events in
the world when, in fact, no such intentional agents are
present. Possessing an agent detection system that is
biased toward overdetection presumably conveys an
evolutionary advantage:

MEMES NOT GENES

Currently, the most popular answer to that question
for advocates of an evolutionary psychology of religion
is to be found in the study of memetics, an approach to
the question of the evolutionary origins of cultural and
social phenomena“that invokes not just biochemical facts
but the whole world of cultural anthropology” (Dennett,
2006, p. 140). Memetics, as a conceptual approach,
posits the existence and studies the replication, spread

The expense of false positives (seeing agents where there
are none) is minimal, if we can abandon these misguided
intuitions quickly. In contrast, the cost of not detecting
agents when they are actually around (either predator or
prey) could be very high. (Boyer, 2001, p. 145).
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transmission (Blackmore, 1999). The utility of religion,
then, is that it serves “as a structure supporting and
mechanism promoting moral codes” that, in turn, help
to stabilize society so as to better ensure individual
and group survival (Broom, 2003). Religious talk of
meaningful experience, truth, or the transcendent and
ineffable is really just so much talk, spurred on by
nothing more than simple genetic necessity packaged as
memes.
The sort of biological and mechanical reductionism
being advocated here by so many evolutionary
psychologists has, however, been subjected to considerable
criticism by thinkers both in and out of the discipline
(see, e.g., Gantt & Reber, 1999; Johnson, 1995; Menuge,
2004; O’Hear, 1997; Poulshock, 2001; Rose & Rose,
2000; Williams, 1996). Because this critical literature is
so vast and so varied, we will not attempt to recount it all
here. Rather, we will simply note that the main thrust of
these critiques has been that the biological reductionism
and necessary determinism inherent in evolutionary
explanations do not so much explain religion as explain
it away. That is to say, because evolutionary theories in
psychology tend to reduce all human social behaviors
to nothing more than the necessitated byproducts of
impersonal natural forces acting on the brute physical
matter of the brain and body, they ultimately destroy the
possibility that such behaviors (religious or otherwise)
can be social or meaningful in any genuinely substantive
way (see, e.g., Gantt, 2002; Slife & Williams, 1995).
For although individuals may well experience their
religious lives as personally vital, morally significant, and
intensely real, once the evolutionary psychological story
is in place, religious experience can only be seen as the
merely subjective impression one happens to be left with
in the wake of essentially impersonal, a-meaningful,
and non-social biomechanical processes operating in
the service of entirely contingent genetic ends. The
meaning of religious experience of any kind, then, is just
an illusion–useful in some evolutionary way perhaps
but nonetheless an illusion. Thus once the inescapable
Darwinian conclusions have been drawn, religion can
be seen to be really just the necessitated “by-product
of several cognitive and emotional mechanisms that
evolved under natural selection for mundane adaptive
tasks” (Atran, 2006, p. 302). This is not to say religion
is “an evolutionary adaptation per se, but a recurring
cultural by-product of the complex evolutionary

and evolution of “memes”–a sort of mental or cultural
analogue to genes. A meme is a cognitive or behavioral
pattern that is thought to be transmitted from one
individual to another. However, since individuals
who have transmitted the meme continue to carry it
themselves, the transmission is in reality more along the
lines of a replication. As Pearcey (2004) notes, “Just as
genes are the carriers of physical traits, so memes are
hypothetical units of culture that are said to be carriers
of ideas” (p. 61).
Oxford zoologist Richard Dawkins, who coined the
term in his 1976 book The Selfish Gene, suggested:
Examples of memes are tunes, ideas, catch-phrases,
clothes fashions, ways of making pots or of building
arches. Just as genes propagate themselves in the gene
pool by leaping from body to body via sperms or eggs,
so memes propagate themselves in the meme pool by
leaping from brain to brain via a process which, in the
broad sense, can be called imitation. (p. 192)

Religion is memetic: Whatever the particular
biological and environmental origins of religion happen
to be, it has managed to attain a significant level of
penetrance and perdurance in the cultural environment
that has allowed its continued survival as a stable social
practice (Blackmore, 1999). And as Dawkins (1976) has
argued:
The survival value of the god meme in the meme pool
results from its great psychological appeal. It suggests
that injustices in this world may be rectified in the next.
The “everlasting arms” hold out a cushion against our
own inadequacies which, like a doctor’s placebo, is none
the less effective for being imaginary. These are some of
the reasons why the idea of God is copied so readily by
successive generations of individual brains. God exists,
if only in the form of a meme with high survival value, or
infective power, in the environment provided by human
culture. (p. 193)

On this model then, religion originates in some set
of naturally selected genetic tendencies to behave in
particular ways–which, in turn, provide for a cultural
context within which certain sets of genes can further
propagate themselves and are propagated by the
transmission of memes in a process analogous to genetic
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landscape that sets cognitive, emotional, and material
conditions for ordinary human interactions” (Atran,
2006, p. 304). Despite the ardent and deeply held
beliefs of its practitioners and defenders, in the final
evolutionary psychological analysis, religion is really
nothing more than a complex set of irrational myths
and bizarre rituals that processes of natural selection
have curiously produced in us so that we can cope with
the fundamentally arbitrary and meaningless nature
of existence as we get on with the vital business of
reproduction.

which relies only on the traditional analytic approaches of
mainstream psychology of religion, Belzen (2001) argues,
would be incapable of dealing with a phenomenon like
spirituality in it richness.
In addition to offering a definition of psychology,
Gorsuch (2001) defines spirituality in the following
manner:
Spirituality consists of our relationship to the broader
reality of which we are a part, our role in this reality,
and how we align ourselves, including our behavior to
be consistent with that reality . . .[It] is the quest for
understanding ourselves in relationship to our view
of ultimate reality, and to live in accordance with that
understanding. (p. xx)

PSYCHOLOGY AND RELIGION

The foregoing discussion of evolutionary psychological approaches to religion brings clearly into focus
the context in which Wulff (2003) offers a description
of the field of psychology of religion as being in crisis
and calls for a return to an older tradition which sought
to get at the meaning of religious experience (see also
Belzen, 2001; Richardson, 2006). Wulff (2003) and
others perceive a need to avoid the co-opting of the field
of “psychology of religion” by those interested principally
in religious apologetics and at the same time avoid those
whose only interest is in mapping religious behaviors as
just another class of behaviors generally. Based on the
analysis presented above, we maintain that the field has
gone too far in the latter direction. Similar concerns
seem to be at the heart of the recent turn in the field
toward interest in spirituality.
Richard Gorsuch (2003) takes up the topic of
spirituality in a recent volume to which he gave the
interrogatory title Integrating Psychology and Spirituality?
Gorsuch (2003) defines psychology as “the scientific
study of human behavior in its immediate context” (p. xx).
Obviously, in employing this definition it is still entirely
possible to have a psychology of religion that mainly
employs traditional scientific methods to understand
religiously relevant behaviors. Under such a regime, for
example, religiosity is simply a personality variable–one
source of influence among many. Belzen (2001), however,
is critical of such a “problematic, or at least short-sighted
. . . application of psychological reasoning to religion”
(pp. 45-46). He argues that such an approach narrows
the definition of religion to a “sentiment” or “personality
trait” or some “inherent property” and ignores the cultural,
social, and historical aspects of religion. An approach

He further points out that spirituality in this sense
does not require belief in or the existence of any deity.
Although one might, and many certainly would
argue that the conception of spirituality without a deity
is ultimately unsatisfactory, if not impossible, it seems
clear that spirituality is an important and widespread
human phenomenon, and that it is of increasing
interest to psychology, to other social sciences, and to
contemporary culture. Furthermore, Gorsuch (2001)
has taken us to the heart of the matter, to what we
believe to be the central question for any psychology of
religion, and to the heart of its current crisis as described
here. It is simply this: Psychology and religion will
always be at odds and any interface between them–as
in a “psychology of religion” –will be deeply problematic
unless the psychology and the religion (a) can be
understood–even potentially–from the same intellectual
grounds and (b) are both established on grounds that
take us past methods and models to metaphysics, and
that (c) those metaphysical grounds are sophisticated
enough to allow both for rigorous intellectual analysis
of the psychology of religious phenomena and for the
existence of genuinely meaningful spiritual (or religious)
behavior. In line with Porpora (2006), the case we are
making here is not that psychologists of religion must
necessarily admit or even presuppose supernatural realities.
It may be an entirely empirical matter that there are no
supernatural realities out there to be experienced and
that all are mistaken who think they do experience such
things. The argument of this paper is instead that such
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assessment should be an empirical conclusion rather
than an a priori disciplinary assumption, which as
such forever remains equally beyond either support or
contestation. (p. 59; italics in the original)
In short, we are claiming that religious experience
should be considered in its own right as what it claims
to be in the very experiencing of it, not reduced to
something other than what it claims to be because of
the incompatible metaphysics forced upon it by the
naturalistic assumptions of an alien psychology.
It is precisely in the consideration of these issues
that we believe the work of Emmanuel Levinas can
make its greatest contribution. His work has the
potential to produce both a sophisticated psychology
and a non-reductive understanding of religion and to
set them on the same metaphysical grounds. Because
his work is uncommon in this respect, we consider
it possible that his position not only provides a new
and creative psychology of religious behaviors along
the hermeneutic lines Wulff (2003) and others (e.g.,
Browning & Cooper, 2004; Richardson, 2006) have
called for, but because it grounds psychology and
religion in the same metaphysics, it may possibly offer a
psychology of religion itself.

in general terms, other than the ego–that which escapes
or exceeds my ability to capture, conceptualize and
explain by my own mind. This “otherness” is sometimes
referred to as “alterity”--that which “overflows” the self
and the self ’s conceptualizations (Levinas, 1969, 1985).
For Levinas the absolutely Other is God (Levinas,
1985; see also Bloechl, 2000). There is a religious feel to
much of Levinas’s writings, in part because he produced
some overtly religious works, and in part because he
freely mixed religious language and metaphor into his
phenomenology.
The field of psychology of religion has struggled at
times with defining its subject matter because doing so
would necessitate a definition of “religion” itself. In a
discipline such as psychology–a discipline which does
not readily embrace theistic positions–this has created
more than a few problems. However, if theism is not
seen as necessary for religion, one is not only left to
wonder just what religion is, but one also becomes
quite hard pressed to distinguish religion from any
other cognitive or emotive activity (Belzen, 2001). In
such an intellectual climate–where religion has no
status different from any other source of behavior, and
religious experience and religious behaviors are not
inherently different from any other types of behaviors
or concepts–a psychology of religion cannot help but
lose its identity and become indistinguishable from
psychology in general. It has been a matter of some
discussion in the field of psychology of religion just
how religion ought to be defined in order to include all
perspectives and yet retain its identity as a distinct factor
in attitudes, personality, and behavior.
In the context of the foregoing discussion, Levinas’s
work makes a singular contribution. With the exception
perhaps, of those who wish to concoct a “religion” and
allow it to spring fully formed, not from the head of
Zeus, but from their own heads, and ground it in their
own subjectivity and preferences, none should argue
against the idea that the very essence of any religion is a
recognition of otherness and even, perhaps, an absolute
otherness. This recognition and quest to understand
absolute otherness may or may not involve theism: i.e.,
explicit reference to a god. This same recognition–of
the importance of otherness–is also entirely compatible
with contemporary notions of spirituality (see, e.g.,
Gorsuch, 2003). Thus it appears that Levinas’s work
provides a foundation for a psychology of religion. If

PSYCHOLOGY OF RELIGION AND THE WORK
OF EMMANUEL LEVINAS

The work of the French phenomenological philosopher, Emmanuel Levinas1, has recently stirred
considerable interest in academic circles. Levinas’s work
is firmly rooted in the phenomenological tradition of
such thinkers as Husserl, Merleau-Ponty and Heidegger
(Spiegelberg, 1994).
Over the course of a career spanning most of the 20th
century, Levinas produced a careful explication of the
experience of what it means to be a human being. In
this essay we will deal briefly with two of the aspects of
his work that most directly address the issues we have
introduced regarding the interface between psychology
and religion and the possibility of a psychology of
religion. Central to any understanding of Levinas is the
concept of otherness (Levinas, 1969). The Other stands
as a contrast to and antidote for the individual ego that
is assumed by much of contemporary psychological
theory to be at the core of our identity as persons. The
absolutely other is that which is absolutely other than I–
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otherness is at the heart of our experience of being
human and also at the heart of religion and spirituality,
any psychology that seeks to understand human beings
in terms of how they act and find meaning in a world
infused with otherness is indeed a psychology of religion,
since religion is likewise infused with otherness. Thus a
psychology grounded in Levinas’s work will necessarily
focus considerable attention on the fundamental fact
and the resultant praxis of being confronted both in
the particular and in general with otherness. It might
be said that this is the fundamental fact and praxis of
religion as well. Thus Levinas’s work puts religion and
psychology on the same grounds: i.e., both involve
carefully examining our lives as we live in the face of
otherness. And we must recognize these as legitimate
intellectual grounds.
Two additional points should be kept in mind
in regard to this common ground for religion and
psychology. First, the great potential for Levinas’s work
to produce a rich and intriguing psychology of religion
and to succeed where others have failed derives from
the fact that religion–as the confrontation with absolute
alterity–is not just an idea or cultural tradition among
many similar ideas and traditions. Thus a thoughtful
scholar of religion who is grounded in a Levinasian
perspective will not be drawn off by the inevitable and
banal questions of our age, such as “Whose religion?” and
“Why do you claim your religious perspective is right?”
Rather, in following Levinas, such a scholar would
recognize that the alterity which underlies religion is the
very wellspring of human identity and self-consciousness
(Narbonne, 2007). Thus religion is not to be studied as
a mere idea or social institution which an individual
ego encounters somewhere along the road of life and
must evaluate for him or herself. On the contrary, the
alterity that is the essence of religion is also the seed bed
of the human psyche, and it is the core reality in terms
of which we become who we are (Cohen, 2002). Thus
any psychology of religion that takes Levinas seriously
will be at once a fundamental psychology—not at the
periphery, but at the heart of the entire psychological
enterprise.
Second, Levinas’s position is a strong one in the
context of today’s skepticism because religion is not a
matter of ideas; it does not exist first or even essentially
as ideas. Levinas takes us immediately away from ideas
toward the world of lived experience—from questions

such as “What do I think about God or about my
religion?” to the essential question: “How do I respond
to the Other?” For Levinas, the absolutely Other
(God) is always reflected in what he refers to as the
face, meaning that any encounter with an other person
reveals to me in some sense otherness. In addition, it is
this very encounter with an other (person–infused with
otherness) that calls me into being as the being that I
am– since before any such encounter there would be no
particular reason for awareness of a self. Thus “religion”
(as an encounter with absolute alterity) brings us into
being as the kind of beings we are, and, since otherness
always comes to our attention in engagement with
concrete other persons, “religion,” as the encounter with
alterity, also takes us immediately to moral response
and calls us to social action. We are called into being by
the presence of the particular face of a particular other.
We are drawn therein into the ethical world. This
is important to note because it is the concern for the
ethical that draws many to the psychology of religion
in the first place. Indeed, many have argued that ethical
concern is the essence of any religion (see, e.g., Eliade,
1959; James, 1905; Taylor, 2007).
Because Levinas maintains that our very coming
to be as persons—and thus what is most essential
and basic in us—is occasioned by a fundamentally
ethical situation—the encounter with another person
whose very face reflects to us otherness and even God,
putting us in a state of ethical obligation to respond to
them–his account of us is “metaphysical” (i.e., it says
something about what is essential in us). Thus his
work is often described as an “ethical metaphysics,” or
a “metaphysics of the ethical” (see, e.g., Wyschogrod,
2000). Levinas’s “metaphysics of the ethical” arises
from the fact that otherness is the fundamental ground
from which any analyses of our understanding of our
own humanity must begin. The fact that our contact
with otherness is always and at once an ethical call viz
a viz concrete others makes it an ethical metaphysic.
Here again, in the sphere of ethics, Levinas’s position
is stronger than those which have usually informed
contemporary ethical discourse. Following Levinas’s
thrust, the ethical does not derive from the rational
powers of the individual ego, nor from that ego’s brain
chemistry or its history of contingent reinforcers–which
puts that ego in a position of trying to figure out how
obligated it is and then what would be the ethical but
10
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not too costly course of action. For Levinas, the ethical
call or impulse is not principle driven at all. The ethical
has its roots in the primitive encounter with the other
in the context of the simultaneous emergence of a keen
and piercing recognition of the Other–otherness itself
(Levinas, 1968, 1998). The “other person” or “other
mind” has always been a “problem” for philosophy
and certainly for psychology because the encounter of
the ego with the other is the encounter of two selfcontained subjectivities (see, e.g., Robinson, 1998). In
such an encounter ethical obligation becomes equally
problematic because each mind must assess its rational
obligation, derive principles for responding, etc., and the
very principles that guide such deliberations are never
sure, self-evident, or obviously universal. Any ethical
claim or obligation must first pass a cognitive test based
on rational analysis, then it must be inculcated into
solitary minds as a rational imperative; finally we must
overcome the “weakness of the will.” All must be done in
a context of uncertainty about the rightness of either the
obligation or the process of responding.
However, if Levinas is right, neither the other person
nor ethical obligation constitute “problems” in the
philosophical or rational sense; nor is the ethical itself
based first in abstract rational principles. Rather, the
encounter with concrete other persons in one’s own lived
experience is the occasion for coming to be as a person.
The ethical obligation is not engendered by rationality,
but arises non-deliberatively in that very coming to
be. Principles are generated as guides to action (rather
than serving as motivations for action) as we make our
way through a world of infinite asymmetrical ethical
obligation (Williams & Gantt, 1998). From a Levinasian
perspective, psychology of religion does not need to join
the battle around issues of moral theory, nor does it need
to justify the ethical as a topic of study. The ethical is
already at the very core of both psychology and religion.

CONCLUSION

Thus in conclusion, we believe that the work of
Emmanuel Levinas has the potential to contribute
significantly to a careful re-examination of the
investigatory priorities of the psychology of religion.
For example, when informed by his work psychologists
of religion might well be drawn to the investigate their
understanding of the meaning of otherness and the
strategies and effects of living in and responding to a
world saturated with ethical obligation in the face of
otherness. We would hope such research priorities
might replace the current preoccupation with finding
the evolutionary purposes served by religion and the
biochemical origin of sophisticated beliefs and even of
spirituality. We hold such a change in research priorities
to be profoundly desirable to prevent religion from being
explained to death.
Levinas’s work also has the potential of turning
psychology of religion into a fundamental psychology–
fundamental in the sense that to understand the essence
of “religious” behavior is to understand the essence of
human behavior itself. This is because the metaphysical
foundation of human behavior (behavior in the face of
otherness) is the same as the metaphysical foundation of
religion (behavior in the face of otherness). Such behaving
in the face of otherness is a far cry from behaving at the
whim of memes, genes, and whatever survival strategies
might be in vogue in this era. A psychology of “religion”
as understood from the perspective of Levinas’s work may
very well be the psychology of human beings. By requiring
psychology of religion to attend more directly to our
actual lived experience of alterity encountered in the face
of the other, Levinasian phenomenology offers a common
metaphysical ground upon which a genuinely scientific
psychology of religion and a truly religious psychology of
religion can–perhaps for the first time—meet.
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C. Bishop (Eds.), Between Chance and Choice: Interdisciplinary
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